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The empirical literature studying the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy shocks uses VAR models to char-
acterize the economy. The existing papers di⁄er among each other in two important elements:
the methodology used for the identi￿cation of ￿scal policy shocks and the VAR speci￿cation.
Not suprisingly the results obtained are often diverse. The aim of this paper is to test whether
di⁄erences in the results can be explained by di⁄erent VAR speci￿cations or they are an outcome
of the di⁄erent methodologies implemented. In order to evaluate it we build a common VAR and
then we compare the impulse responses obtained using di⁄erent methodologies. We ￿nd that if
the order of variables in the recursive approach is well selected, there are only minor di⁄erences
between the impulse responses obtained using the recursive approach and the Blanchard-Perotti
approach, both for government expenditure and government revenue shocks. However the ￿scal
dummy variable approach yields signi￿cantly di⁄erent impulse responses than the ones generated
by the other two methodologies.
JEL Classi￿cation: C32, E20, E60, E62
11 Introduction
For the last ten years the number of empirical studies investigating the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy shocks on
the economy has increased considerably. Following the empirical literature on the e⁄ects of monetary
policy shocks, all these studies use VAR models to describe the structure of the economy. But they
di⁄er for the methodology used to identify ￿scal policy shocks. We can group these methodologies in
four main categories:
￿ Recursive approach which is based on the so-called Cholesky decomposition.
￿ Blanchard-Perotti approach which imposes short-term restrictions based on institutional infor-
mation on tax and transfer system.
￿ Mountford-Uhlig approach which imposes sign restrictions directly on the impulse response
functions.
￿ Fiscal dummy variable approach, or narrative approach, which identi￿es exogenous shocks in
military spending through dummy variables, and studies the e⁄ects of a shock to the dummies1.
Although all the empirical literature we refer is based on VAR models, VAR speci￿cations di⁄er,
sometimes considerably, among papers: there are used di⁄erent variables, dataset, sample periods,
dummies and trends.
Results produced by these approaches often di⁄er from each other: For instance there is no agree-
ment on the e⁄ects of an increase in government expenditure or a decrease in government revenue on
consumption and investment, as well as for the e⁄ects on interest rate and in￿ ation.
E⁄ects of ￿scal policy shocks on the economy are extremely important to discern between com-
peting macroeconomic models. For Instance while Keynesian models predict that an increase in
government expenditure should foster private consumption, neoclassical models predict the opposite.
The aim of this paper is to test whether results obtained applying di⁄erent methodologies di⁄er
because of the di⁄erent approach used or because of di⁄erent VAR speci￿cations. In order to evaluate
it we build a common VAR, with a selected number of variables and a common dataset. Then we
compare impulse responses obtained using di⁄erent methodologies. In this version of the paper we
implement the recursive approach, the Blanchard-Perotti approach and the narrative approach. We
1A detailed explanation of these methods is provided in Sections 2 and 3.
2test both for government expenditure and government revenue shocks, except for the ￿scal dummy
variable approach, where it is possible to test only for the ￿rst type of shock
Since the recursive approach does not rely on speci￿c events or assumptions on the structure of
the economy and it is relatively easy to implement, we take it as our benchmark approach. Then
we compare results obtained using the Blanchard-Perotti approach and the ￿scal dummy variable
approach with the results obtained using our benchmark approach.
We ￿nd that if the order of the variables in the recursive approach is well selected, there are
only minor di⁄erences between the impulse responses generated using the recursive approach and
the Blanchard-Perotti approach, both for government expenditure and government revenue shocks.
The comparison between the recursive approach and the ￿scal dummy variable approach leads to
di⁄erent results. Indeed apart from the response of GDP and government spending to a shock to the
latter variable, the impulse responses calculated for the other variables show di⁄erent patterns. It is
important to underline that it is di¢ cult to compare these two approaches because they are based on
two di⁄erent econometric techniques2.
Aside from this introduction the paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature on the
topic. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology, describing the VAR model and the identi￿ca-
tion approaches used in the paper. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 presents conclusions and
the future research agenda.
2 Literature Review
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models have become increasingly popular in modern macroeconomics.
Since Sims introduced VAR analysis in his 1980 seminal paper, this methodology has been largely
applied in order to study e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks on the economy. In contrast, the literature
on applying vector autoregressive models to analyze the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy shocks is rather thin.
The majority of the research has been focused on U.S. economy3. According to the aim of our paper
and following the literature, studies based on VAR analysis in ￿scal policy issues can be grouped into
four main categories:
2This issue is explained in section 4.2
3Almost all the papers reported in our analysis are focused on U.S. We will explicitely mention when this is not the
case.
3A ￿rst approach is the so-called ￿Recursive VAR Approach￿ . It is based on Cholesky decomposition
in order to identify ￿scal policy shocks. Recent papers applying this methodology are written by
FatÆs and Mihov (2001 a, b) and Favero (2002). This approach is based on speci￿c assumptions
concerning the slugginesh of certain variables: For instance in FatÆs and Mihov (2001 b) they assume
that government spending is predetermined with respect to output and government revenue. This
methodology is relatively easy to implement, but it has the disadvantage that results are sensitive to
di⁄erent ordering of variables.
A second approach due to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), relies on institutional information about
tax and transfer systems and about the timing of tax collections in order to identify the automatic
response of taxes and government spending to economic activity. This identi￿cation scheme relies
on a two-step procedure: In a ￿rst step, the institutional information is used to estimate cyclically
adjusted government revenue and government expenditures. In a second step, estimates of ￿scal policy
shocks are obtained. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) applied this approach to estimate the e⁄ects of
government expenditure and government revenue shocks for the United States. Other studies using
this approach are H￿ppner (2003: Chapter 3.3) for Germany, Kuttner and Posen (2002) for Japan, and
Perotti (2004) for ￿ve OECD countries (Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States,
and West Germany). On one side this approach is di¢ cult to implement because it is necessary to
calculate country speci￿c elasticities of government expenditure and government revenue to GDP. On
the other side it should provide a more precise and consistent estimation of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy
shocks with respect to the recursive approach.
The third approach identi￿es ￿scal policy shocks via sign restrictions on the impulse responses.
This approach was introduced by Faust (1998) and Uhlig (1999) to study the e⁄ects of monetary policy
shocks and was applied to ￿scal policy analysis by Mountford and Uhlig (2002) and by Canova and
Pappa (2002). Unlike the recursive VAR approach, the sign-restrictions approach does not impose lin-
ear restrictions on the contemporaneous relations between reduced-form and structural disturbances.
Rather, Mountford and Uhlig (2002) impose restrictions directly on the impulse responses. For in-
stance, a de￿cit spending shock is identi￿ed as increasing in government spending, leaving government
revenues unchanged for four quarters. An advantage of this approach is that it can handle anticipated
￿scal policy shocks. The main disadvantages are that: 1) it is not possible to know when the shock
occurs; 2) it rules out by assumption such phenomena as ￿expansionary ￿scal contractions￿that have
4received a lot of attention in the recent literature on the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy4.
A fourth approach is the ￿scal dummy variable approach (or narrative approach) introduced by
Ramey and Shapiro (1998) and further developed by Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999), Burn-
side et. al (2004) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). These studies analyze the e⁄ects of large
increases in military spending in the United States. The underlying idea is that spending increases
associated with the Korean war, the Vietnam war, and the Reagan military build-up can be viewed as
essentially unrelated to the state of the economy. Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) apply this method-
ology in order to assess the state of U.S. economy in the aftermath of 9/11. They conclude that the
large exogenous increase in government spending experienced after 9/11 did not produce the same
e⁄ects on the economy as the Ramey and Shapiro episodes. The major advantage of this approach is
that there is no need for the identi￿cation of a structural form. On the other and, other substantial
￿scal shocks can be occurred around the same time, thus polluting the identi￿cation of the military
build-up shocks. Moreover this methodology does not allow the analysis of a tax shock.
The studies mentioned above agree for some aspects while disagree for others. All of them ￿nd
that an increase in government expenditure or a cut in government revenue produce positive e⁄ects on
output. The most controversial ￿ndings are related to the e⁄ects of ￿scal shocks to consumption and
investment. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) documented a positive response of consumption to positive
spending shock, while investment decreases as consequence of both a tax and a spending shock. FatÆs
and Mihov (2001 a,b) ￿nd a positive response of consumption and investment to a spending shock.
According to Mountford and Uhlig (2002) consumption does not react to an increase in government
spending while it decreases after an increase in tax; investment declines in both cases. Edelberg,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) show an increase of private consumption. Burnside et al. (2004) show
that consumption does not respond signi￿cantly to a spending shock, while investment rises on impact
and then it converges quickly to its preshock level.
3 Methodology
Our VAR benchmark speci￿cation can be written in a reduced form as follow:
4See Gavazzi et al. (2000).
5Xt = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t2 + A(L)Xt￿1 + ￿D1 + ￿D2 + ut (1)
where:
￿ ￿0 is a constant; t represents a linear trend and t2 represents a quadratic trend.
￿ A(L) is a (nxn) matrix representing a lag polynomial. We decided to include four lags.
￿ Xt = [gt;yt;tt;￿t;it] represents the vector of macroeconomic variables necessary to describe the
economy: gt is the log of real government expenditure on good and services per-capita; tt is the
log of real net primary revenues per-capita (de￿ned as government revenues less government
transfers, both net of property income)5; yt is the log of real output per-capita; ￿t is the GDP
de￿ ator; it is the 3-month Treasury Bill Interest Rate.
￿ D1 is a dummy variable which assumes value 1 during the so-called "Ramey - Shapiro" episodes:
the Korean War (1950:3), the Vietnam War (1965:1) and the Carter-Reagan build-up (1980:1);
0 otherwise. We call it "War Dummy".
￿ D2 is a dummy variable capturing the large 1975 tax cut6: it takes value 1 in t = 1975 : 2; 0
otherwise.







t] is the vector of reduced form residuals, which in general have nonzero
cross correlation.
We use quarterly data for U.S. for the 1947:1 2004:4 period. More information about data can be
found in the appendix. The VAR is estimated using equation-by-equation least squares.
In a second step we augment the vector of variables to Xt = [gt;zt;yt;tt;￿t;it] where zt indicates
either consumption, investment (both in log and real per-capita terms), employment in the private
sector and hourly wage in the manufacturing sector7. We run a 6-variable VAR with the variable of
interest zt changing . This approach is implemented in order to avoid the estimation of a large number
of parameters simultaneously.
5This measure follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Mountford and Uhlig (2002).
6See Blanchard Perotti(2002)
7We decided to take the hourly wage in the manufacturing sector because the same series for the private sector starts
only in 1964:1.
6We are interested in investigating the e⁄ects of shocks in government expenditure and govern-
ment revenue on our set of macroeconomic variables. But we cannot do it using this reduced form
speci￿cation. The variance covariance matrix ￿ = E[utu0
t] is not a diagonal matrix. This imply
that we cannot identify the consequences of a shock in, say , government expenditure, on our set of
macroeconomic variables. Indeed, if we would give a standard deviation shock to this variable, the
system would be a⁄ected to shocks to the other variables as well, through the covariance relation. In
order to overcome this problem, we have to transform ￿ into a diagonal matrix, i.e. we have to solve
the so called identi￿cation problem.
In this paper we consider two solutions to the identi￿cation problem. The ￿rst one, known as
the recursive approach, was introduced by Sims(1980) and relies on the Cholesky decomposition. We
take the speci￿cation used in FatÆs and Mihov (2001 b). The second solution has been developed
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who relies on institutional information about the tax and transfer
system to identify the short-run relationship between government spending, tax and GDP. For the
second solution we will use the speci￿cation presented in Perotti (2004). In the following subsections
we analyze more in detail these identi￿cation schemes. The last subsection provides the intuition
behind the so-called ￿scal dummy variable approach.
3.1 Recursive approach
If we premultiply eq (1) by the (nxn) matrix A0 we obtain the structural form
A0Xt = A0 + A0￿1t + A0￿2t2A￿(L)Xt￿1 + A0￿D1 + A0￿D2 + Bet (2)
where A￿ = A0A and Bet = A0ut describe the relations between the structural disturbances et
and the reduced-form disturbances ut. In the literature this representation of the structural form is
often called the AB model8 The aim of our identi￿cation procedure is to select B and A0 in such
a way that the variance covariance matrix of the structural disturbances, denoted by D = E[ee0] is
diagonal. In the Cholesky decomposition introduced by Sims (1980), B is restricted to be an identity
matrix and A0 to be a lower triangular matrix:
8Amisano and Giannini (1997)


























a11;0 0 0 0 0
a21;0 a22;0 0 0 0
a31;0 a32;0 a33;0 0 0
a41;0 a42;0 a43;0 a44;0 0










This methodology has been used in FatÆs and Mihov (2001 a, b) to study the e⁄ects of a shock to
government spending. The order of variables plays a central role in the application of this identi￿cation
scheme. It de￿nes the short-run relations between variables. The order selected in this paper is the
following:
[gt;zt;yt;tt;￿t;it] (7)
with zt = [ct;invt;empt;wt]
We decided to order government expenditure, consumption and investment before GDP because
of all them are components of GDP in the National Account Identity. Government revenue is or-
dered after GDP in order to capture the automatic response of government revenue to business cycle
￿ uctuations. Order of in￿ ation and interest rate are selected following the Taylor Rule. As shown is
Section 4.1, inverting the order of these two variables would change substantially the impulse response
functions.
83.2 Blanchard-Perotti Approach
We refer to the identi￿cation scheme used by Perotti (2004), an extension of the original Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) in order to take into account in￿ ation and interest rate. Their key assumption
is to consider absent the e⁄ect of a shock to economic activity in determining ￿scal policy within a
quarter. Thus they can estimate the automatic response of ￿scal variables to economic activity and
by implication to obtain estimates of ￿scal policy shocks.














































Using institutional information about the tax and transfer systems they estimate the elasticities of
government revenue and expenditure to GDP, in￿ ation and interest rate (the elasticities involving the
last two variables are estimated only in Perotti (2004)). Then they construct the cyclically adjusted
￿scal shocks and they use these measures as instruments for estimating the remaining equations.
In our estimation procedure,instead, we take the estimates of elasticities of government expenditure
and revenue to GDP, in￿ ation and interest rate (￿gi = ￿ti = 0 ,￿t￿ = 0; ￿g￿ = ￿0:5 , ￿ty = 1:85;
9￿t￿ = 1:259 and ￿gy = 0)10 and we assume ￿gt = 0 (that is, we assume expenditure decisions are









1 0 0 ￿0:5 0
0 1 ￿1:85 ￿1:25 0
￿yg ￿yt 1 0 0
￿￿g ￿￿t ￿￿y 1 0














































1 0 0 0 0
￿tg 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0






































That is, we rewrite the relations between reduced form errors and structural shocks in an AB form:
Aut = Bet (14)
In Perotti (2004) the baseline VAR contains the same set of variables used in this paper (although
he uses a 10-year nominal interest rate). But the sample period is di⁄erent: indeed in his paper it
goes from 1960:1 to 2001:4 for U.S., and throughout the paper he divides the sample into two parts,
with the break set in 1979:4.
3.3 The Fiscal Dummy Variable Approach
The ￿scal dummy variable approach, also known as narrative approach, has been introduced by Ramey
and Shapiro (1998). In our paper we take the speci￿cation used in Edelberg Eichenbaum and Fisher
(1999) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). The idea behind this approach is to consider
defense spending as proxy of government spending. Then, following Ramey and Shapiro (1998) they
isolate three exogenous events that led to large military buildups: the Korean War, the Vietnam War
and the Carter-Reagan Buildup. They de￿ne the set of war dummy variables Dt; where Dt = 1 if
t = f1950 : 3;1965 : 1;1980 : 1g; 0 otherwise. The VAR can be written as:
9We check the robustness of our results testing for di⁄erent values of ￿ty; ￿t￿ and ￿g￿:
10see Appendix 2 - Perotti (2004)
11As documented in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004), taking ￿tg = 0 would not change the results
because the correlation between net tax and spending is low.
10Xt = ￿0 + ￿1t + A(L)Xt￿1 + ￿D1 + ut (15)
A and ￿ are estimated using equation-by-equation least squares. The dynamic response of Xt to
a shock in defense expenditure can be studied assuming that D1 takes value of one.
Their VAR speci￿cations presents several di⁄erences from our benchmark VAR:
￿ they use di⁄erent sets of variables with respect to our speci￿cation: For instance in Edelberg,
Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999) the log of the producer price index of crude fuel is included in
the baseline VAR; the log level of Ramey and Shapiro￿ s measure of real defense purchases is
used as proxy of government expenditure; a measure of government revenue is not included in
the set of variables.
￿ In the VAR is included a break in the linear trend in 1973:2 (Burnside et al.), there is no
quadratic trend, as well as there is not our second dummy variable for the net tax cut episode
of 1975:2.
￿ The sample goes from 1948:1 to 1996:1 in Edelberg et al. (1999) and from 1947:1 to 1995:4 in
Burnside et al. (2004)
An important point to underline is that we are implicitly assuming that this methodology can
be applied using government expenditure instead of military spending, hypothesis implicitly assumed
in most studies belonging to the literature. For instance in Burnside et. al. (2004) they use real
government purchases instead of military spending.
4 Results
In order to compare the results obtained using these three di⁄erent approaches, we take the recursive
approach as benchmark. First we show the response of the economy to shocks in government expen-
ditures and government revenue using this method. Then we compare these results with the ones
obtained using the Blanchard-Perotti approach and the ￿scal dummy variable approach.
11In order to determine a common speci￿cation for our VAR, we implemented our analysis using
a VAR with the war dummy and one without it, to test whether the responses obtained with the
recursive approach and Blanchard-Perotti were robust to di⁄erent speci￿cations. Indeed in FatÆs and
Mihov (2001a,b) and Perotti (2004) VARs do not include the war dummy. Results showed that impulse
responses are almost the same using both speci￿cations. There are slight di⁄erences for investment
and government expenditure, while there are larger di⁄erences for the interest rate, but still negligible
for a⁄ecting our results12. So we decided to include in our VAR the war dummy.
For the recursive approach and for Blanchard-Perotti we analyze both a government expenditure
shock and a government revenue shock. For GDP, government revenue, government expenditure,
consumption and investment we calculate ￿scal multipliers, that is we express responses as dollar
change in each variable to a dollar shock in one of the ￿scal variables. For the remaining variables
instead we show the percent change in each variable to a standard deviation shock in the one of
the ￿scal variables. Numerical results are presented in Tables 1,2,3,4. For the ￿scal dummy variable
approach we calculate only the ￿scal multiplier for GDP, as in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004). Results
are reported in Table 5.
4.1 Recursive Approach
Response to Government Expenditure Shock
Figure 2 and Figure 2a show responses to a shock to government expenditure. On impact GDP
increases by 50 cents and then it increases to reach a peak of 91 cents after 9 quarters. From then
on, it converges to the trend.Government expenditure and government revenue also show a positive
response to the shock, the former with a peak of 1.36 dollar after 4 quarters, the latter with a peak
of 71 cents after 10 quarters. As GDP, after the peak they converge to trend.
The response of GDP de￿ ator is small. and persistently negative. The response of the interest
rate is negative, with a trough of -12.23 percent after 5 quarters and then a tendency to converge to
its equilibrium.
The response of consumption is zero on impact. It reaches a peak of 37 cents after 9 quarters
and then it converges to its equilibrium. Investment instead, reacts negatively on impact, reaching a
trough of - 1 dollar after 4 quarters. It reaches the equilibrium after ten quarters.
12Results are available upon request
12Employment does not almost react to the shock, while the nominal wage decrease steadily.
We can compare our results with the one presented in FatÆs and Mihov (2001b). The major
di⁄erences regard the response of investment (positive) and the response of interest rate (smaller and
positive on impact). Responses of other variables show the same sign, although patterns can change.
Response to Government Revenue Shock
Figure 3 and 3a show responses to a shock to government revenue. GDP does not react on impact,
becoming positive for the ￿rst year. Later on it starts declining with a trough after 9 quarters of - 81
cents. Them it converges to its trend. Government expenditure shows a positive small reaction from
the 2nd to the 13th quarter. Government revenue tends to converge quickly to its steady state, but
from the 13th quarter it starts increasing again. The response of GDP de￿ ator is not signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from 0, while the interest rate shows a positive reaction until the 8th quarter; then it becomes
negative without converging to its steady state.
Consumption again does not react on impact, but then it shows a negative pattern, with the peak
of 54 cents after 8 quarters. Investment remains slightly positive for the ￿rst 4 quarters. Then it
becomes negative until the 16th quarter, when it reaches its preshock equilibrium. Employment does
not show any signi￿cant reaction, while the nominal wage shows a small negative reaction only two
years after the shock.
The results would have completely changed if we had used another ordering for the variables.
In particular, ordering government revenue before GDP would have produced a di⁄erent outcome.
But, as shown in Figure 3b and in Figure 3c, this alternative order is inconsistent because it predicts
an increase in GDP, consumption and investment after a positive government revenue shock. This
underline the importance of selecting a reasoned order of variables in implementing the recursive
approach.
Summing up, GDP and consumption show a positive reaction to a government expenditure shock
and a negative reaction to government revenue shock. Investment reacts negatively to both types
of shock. Interest rate declines after a government spending shock, while it reacts positively to an
expenditure shock, to become negative after two years. The response of employment is never signi￿cant
while nominal wage decreases slightly with both type of shocks. Our results di⁄er from FatÆs and
Mihov (2001b) concerning the sign of the impulse responses for investment and for interest rate.
134.2 Comparing the Recursive Approach with the Blanchard-Perotti Ap-
proach
Government Expenditure Shock
Figure 4 and Figure 4a show impulse responses to an expenditure shock calculated using the
recursive approach and the Blanchard-Perotti approach. The two methods provide similar responses.
The only slight di⁄erences are connected to the magnitude of peaks for GDP and government revenue,
respectively of 16 cents and 14 cents. Consumption seems to be shifted toward the x-axis using the
Blanchard-Perotti method, with a di⁄erence in the peak of 11 cents. Interest rate shows a 2-percent
di⁄erence in the response for the 3rd and 4th quarters, to become the same later on. Di⁄erences for
the other variables can be considered negligible.
Government Revenue Shock
Figure 5 and Figure 5a provides the comparison of the two methods in presence of a government
revenue shock. In this case di⁄erences between methods are even smaller. None of the variables
considered in our analysis show a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence in the impulse responses estimated
with these two methods.
Summarizing, impulse responses obtained implementing the recursive and the Blanchard-Perotti
approaches seem to be similar, showing only minor di⁄erences in presence of an expenditure shock.
In general our results seem to be consistent with the one obtained in Perotti (2004)13.Substantial
di⁄erences appear in the response of the interest rate, but as mentioned before, he uses a 10-year
interest rate while we use a 3-month interest rate. Other di⁄erences can be present in the pattern of
impulse responses to other variables but not in the signs. In our framework is puzzling the response of
GDP to a shock to government revenue. Indeed both Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti(2004)
show in their papers that the response of GDP should be negative on impact, while we obtain a
response of 0. But form the 10th quarter the two functions do not show substantial di⁄erences. We
will further investigate the source of this di⁄erence.
13He tests for a positive government expenditure shock and a negative government revenue shock (tax cut).
144.3 Comparing the Recursive Approach with the Fiscal Dummy Variable
Approach
The magnitude of the impulse responses calculated using the recursive approach and the ones calcu-
lated using the ￿scal dummy variable approach di⁄ers in a signi￿cant way. In the recursive approach
the impulse response function gives the percentage response of the variable to a one-standard-deviation
shock to the ￿scal variable. In the narrative approach instead, the impulse response function gives
the percentage response of the variable to a unit shock in the war dummy. Moreover it is not possible
to scale the impulse responses in order to bring them to a comparable magnitude. Indeed while the













the impulse response of GDP obtained via the narrative approach is simply:
logGDPd ￿ logGDP (17)
where eq (17) represents the di⁄erence in the GDP forecast produced by the VAR with a shock in
the war dummy (logGDPd) and by a VAR without a shock in the war dummy (logGDP)
So in order to implement our analysis we compare only the patterns of the impulse responses
generated with the two approaches; then we calculate a ￿scal multiplier for GDP following Eichenbaum
and Fisher (2004) in order to have also a numerical comparison.
Graphic comparison
Figure 6 and Figure 6a show impulse responses calculated using the ￿scal dummy variable ap-
proach. GDP shows a similar pattern with respect to the impulse response calculated with the
recursive approach, but the peak is reached after 5 quarters instead of 9. Interestingly it becomes
negative from the 16th quarter. On impact the response of government spending is slightly negative14,
converging to the trend after a peak at the 6th quarter. The overall pattern seems to be similar to the
impulse response calculated using the recursive approach. The di⁄erent responses on impact are due
14Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher(2004) show exactly the same response.
15to an econometric artefact15. Government revenue shows on impact a stronger initial response with
respect to the recursive approach, with the peak after 6 quarters; after the 15th quarter it becomes
negative. GDP de￿ ator and interest rate show complete di⁄erent patterns. Indeed while using the
￿scal dummy approach they are both positive and for the recursive approach they are both constantly
negative.
Consumption reacts positively on impact, becoming negative after 10 quarters; using the recursive
approach it is always positive. Investment reacts positively in the ￿rst half of the sample, to turn
negative in the second half. Response of investment using the recursive approach is ￿rst negative,
then close to 0. Nominal wage shows opposite reaction functions, while employment shows opposite
reaction functions in the ￿rst half of the sample, but then in both cases it converges to its steady
state. In the narrative approach the convergence takes place 5 quarters later.
Comparing impulse responses obtained in our set-up with the previous empirical literature we ￿nd
that for Burnside et al. (2004) investment shows a milder reaction. Edelberg et al. (1999) reports that
both GDP de￿ ator and interest rate become negative respectively after 10 quarters and 13 quarters.
Responses of GDP, government expenditure, consumption and employment look very similar to our
responses. We cannot compare government revenue and nominal wage, in the papers mentioned above
they use real wage and they divide government revenue into labor tax and capital tax.
Fiscal multiplier
In the studies using the narrative approach, ￿scal multipliers are almost never calculated. The
only exception can be found in Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), where the authors calculated the ￿scal
multiplier of GDP. In particular they calculate the yearly cumulative change in output divided by the
yearly cumulative change in government expenditure. Table 5 shows the results obtained reproducing
this exercise in our framework. It o⁄ers also a comparison with the yearly average of quarterly
multipliers calculated using the recursive approach. For the ￿rst year the two multipliers are almost
equal. But while in the recursive approach the e⁄ect of the expenditure shock reaches its peak after
3 years, in the narrative approach the multiplier steadily declines becoming negative for the last two
years.
15In the recursive approach we scale the impulse responses using the standard deviation of the shock. So the response
of government expenditure to a shock to the same variable is by construction equal to one.
16Our estimate of the ￿scal multiplier for GDP does not di⁄er substantially from the one of Eichen-
baum and Fisher (2004). It appears to be slightly smaller on average. They calculate it only for 4
years, so we do not know whether also their estimate becomes negative in the 5th and 6th year.
The two approaches analyzed in this section seem to produce quite di⁄erent outcomes. Indeed
apart from the responses of GDP and Government expenditure, all the other variables show di⁄erent
patterns of their impulse response functions. Also ￿scal multipliers calculated for GDP show a di⁄erent
pattern. We have to stress that it is not possible to compare the magnitude of the impulse response
functions to the government shock because of the di⁄erent econometric methodologies used.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we compare the impulse response functions generated applying three di⁄erent methods
to identify ￿scal policy shocks. In particular we want to understand whether di⁄erent results reported
in the empirical literature on ￿scal policy shocks are due to di⁄erent VAR speci￿cations or to di⁄erent
econometric approaches. Our main ￿nding is that the recursive approach and the Blanchard-Perotti
approach lead to similar impulse response functions when they are applied on a common VAR and
using a common dataset. This result is obtained testing both for government expenditure and gov-
ernment revenue shocks. The application of the ￿scal dummy variable approach leads to di⁄erent
impulse response functions with respect to the recursive approach, except for responses of GDP and
government expenditure. The latter comparison was implemented only for a government expenditure
shock.
In particular, the three approaches implemented agree on showing a positive reaction of GDP,
government expenditure and government revenue to a positive government expenditure shock. Con-
cerning the other variables, the recursive approach and the Blanchard-Perotti approach on one side,
and the ￿scal dummy variable approach on the other side, produce almost opposite reaction func-
tions. Using the ￿rst two approaches we ￿nd that consumption increases (decreases) and investment
decreases (decreases) after a positive expenditure (revenue) shock.
Our future research will aim to identify the determinants behind the common impulse response
functions obtained for the recursive approach and for the Blanchard-Perotti approach. Then we will
17include in our analysis the sign restriction approach used in Mountford and Uhlig (2002).
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206 Data Appendix
All the components of national income are in real per capita terms and are transformed from their
nominal values by dividing them by the GDP de￿ ator (NIPA table 1.1.4 Row 1) and the population
measure (NIPA table 2.1 Row 38). Data taken from NIPA are revised in March 2005. All the series
are seasonally adjusted by the source.
￿ GDP: This is NIPA table 1.1.5 Row 1.
￿ Private Consumption: This is NIPA table 1.1.5 Row 2.
￿ Total Government Expenditure: This is ￿ Federal Defense Consumption Expenditures￿ , NIPA
table 3.9.5 Row 12, plus ￿ Federal Non Defense Consumption Expenditures￿ , NIPA table 3.9.5
Row 17, plus ￿ State and Local Consumption Expenditures￿ , NIPA table 3.9.5 Row 22, plus
￿ Federal Defense Gross Investment￿ , NIPA table 3.9.5 Row 13, plus ￿ Federal Non Defense Gross
Investment￿ , NIPA table 3.9.5 Row 18, plus ￿ State and Local Gross Investment￿ , NIPA table
3.9.5 Row 23.
￿ Total Government Revenue : This is ￿ Government Current Receipts￿ , NIPA table 3.1 Row 1,
minus ￿ Current Transfers Payments￿ , NIPA table 3.1 Row 17, and ￿ Interest payments￿ , NIPA
table 3.1 Row 22.
￿ Private Domestic Investment: This is ￿ Gross Private Domestic Investment, NIPA table 1.1.5
Row 6.
￿ Interest Rate: Net 3 month Treasury Bill secondary market interest rate (TB3MS); Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We take the arithmetic average of the monthly ￿gures to get a
quarterly ￿gure.
21￿ The GDP De￿ ator: This is NIPA table 1.1.4 Row 1.
￿ Wages: Manufacturing sector- Average hourly earnings of production workers - dollars per hour
(Series Id: CES3000000006), Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
￿ Total Private Employment: Total Private, Quarterly Averages (Series Id: CES0500000081) -
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We take the arithmetic average of the monthly ￿gures to get
a quarterly ￿gure.
22Table 1. Recursive Approach - Responses to a Government Expenditure Shock
Fiscal Multipliers
Quarter 4 8 12 16 20 24 peak
GDP 0.39 0.87 0.76 0.40 0.24 0.19 0.91(9)
Gov. Expend. 1.36 1.02 0.78 0.52 0.29 0.16 1.36(4)
Gov. Rev. 0.18 0.64 0.62 0.31 0.15 0.03 0.71(10)
Consumption 0.14 0.34 0.27 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.37(9)
Investment -1.01 -0.24 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 -1.01(4)
Percent Change
Quarter 4 8 12 16 20 24 peak
GDP De￿ ator -0.19 -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 -0.026 -0.023 -0.029(9)
Interest Rate -10.68 -9.37 -6.12 -4.69 -3.51 -2.39 -12.23(5)
Employment -0.1 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10(3)
Wage -0.18 -0.29 -0.30 -0.33 -0.33 -0.31 -0.33(19)
Fiscal multipliers are de￿ned as dollar change in the variable of interest to a dollar shock in one of
the ￿scal variables. Percent change means percent response in the variable of interest to a standard
deviation shock in the one of the ￿scal variables. Both measures are scaled using the standard
deviation of the structural shock. The number in brackets indicates the quarter when the peak has
been registered.
23Table 2. Recursive Approach - Responses to a Government Revenue Shock
Fiscal Multipliers
Quarter 4 8 12 16 20 24 peak
GDP 0.03 -0.75 -0.64 -0.32 -0.20 -0.13 -0.81(9)
Gov. Expend. 0.24 0.27 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.33(6)
Gov. Rev. 0.8 0.03 0.0 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.92(1)
Consumption -0.28 -0.54 -0.30 -0.20 -0.16 -0.09 -0.54(8)
Investment 0.0 -0.64 -0.32 0.0 0.03 0.0 -0.65(9)
Percent Change
Quarter 4 8 12 16 20 24 peak
GDP De￿ ator 0.08 0.03 -0.06 -0.12 -0.16 -0.21 -0.21(24)
Interest Rate 3.6 -0.30 -2.48 -2.50 -2.07 -1.71 4.43(3)
Employment 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08(11)
Wage 0.05 -0.01 -0.13 -0.18 -0.22 -0.27 -0.27(24)
Fiscal multipliers are de￿ned as dollar change in the variable of interest to a dollar shock in one of
the ￿scal variables. Percent change means percent response in the variable of interest to a standard
deviation shock in the one of the ￿scal variables. Both measures are scaled using the standard
deviation of the structural shock. The number in brackets indicates the quarter when the peak has
been registered.
24Table 3. Blanchard-Perotti Approach - Responses to a Government Expenditure Shock
Fiscal Multipliers
Quarter 4 8 12 16 20 24 peak Peak Recursive approach
GDP 0.36 0.69 0.66 0.37 0.23 0.19 0.75(1) 0.91(9)
Gov. Expend. 1.41 1.06 0.77 0.52 0.29 0.16 1.41(4) 1.36(4)
Gov. Rev. 0.20 0.50 0.52 0.28 0.13 0.07 0.58(10) 0.71(10)
Consumption 0.05 0.22 0.20 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.26(9) 0.37(9)
Investment -1.0 -0.34 0.0 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -1.0(4) -1.01(4)
Percent Change
Quarter 4 8 12 16 20 24 peak Peak Recursive approach
GDP De￿ ator -0.13 -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.17 -0.23(9) -0.29(9)
Interest Rate -9.46 -9.34 -6.36 -4.77 -3.44 -2.12 -11.54(5) -12.23(5)
Employment -0.1 -0.05 0.0 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.10(5) -0.10(3)
Wage -0.14 -0.25 -0.27 -0.28 -0.28 -0.26 -0.28(18) -0.33(19)
Fiscal multipliers are de￿ned as dollar change in the variable of interest to a dollar shock in one of
the ￿scal variables. Percent change means percent response in the variable of interest to a standard
deviation shock in the one of the ￿scal variables. Both measures are scaled using the standard
deviation of the structural shock. The number in brackets indicates the quarter when the peak has
been registered.
25Table 4. Blanchard-Perotti Approach - Responses to a Government Revenue Shock
Fiscal Multipliers - BP - Tax Shock
quarter 4 8 12 16 20 24 peak Peak Recursive approach
GDP -0.04 -0.83 -0.71 -0.37 -0.23 -0.16 -0.89(9) -0.81(9)
Gov. Expend. 0.23 0.27 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.33(6) 0.33(6)
Gov. Rev. 0.87 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.28 0.29 1.01(1) 0.92(1)
Consumption -0.28 -0.57 -0.32 -0.20 -0.16 -0.09 -0.57(8) -0.54(8)
Investment -0.03 -0.70 -0.36 -0.04 0.03 0.0 -0.71(9) -0.65(9)
Percent Change
4 8 12 16 20 24 peak Peak Recursive approach
GDP De￿ ator 0.07 0.0 -0.09 -0.16 -0.22 -0.27 -0.27(24) -0.21(24)
Interest Rate 3.44 -0.48 -2.82 -2.85 -2.41 -2.04 4.34(3) 4.43(3)
Employment 0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11(11) -0.08(11)
Wage 0.07 -0.01 -0.13 -0.19 -0.24 -0.29 -0.29(24) -0.27(24)
Fiscal multipliers are de￿ned as dollar change in the variable of interest to a dollar shock in one of
the ￿scal variables. Percent change means percent response in the variable of interest to a standard
deviation shock in the one of the ￿scal variables. Both measures are scaled using the standard
deviation of the structural shock. The number in brackets indicates the quarter when the peak has
been registered.
Table 5. Fiscal Multipliers for GDP- Fiscal Dummy Variable Approach Vs. Recursive Approach
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Dummy Approach 0.48 0.32 0.19 0.05 -0.07 -0.12
Recursive Approach 0.43 0.69 0.85 0.53 0.28 0.21
For the ￿scal dummy variable approach the ￿scal multiplier is calculated as the yearly cumulative
change in output divided by the yearly cumulative change in government expenditure. For the recursive












Fig.1 - Selected Variables in the United States 1947:1-2004:4
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_____ : Recursive Approach    - - - : Blanchard Perotti Approach 
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_____ : Recursive Approach    - - - : Blanchard Perotti Approach 
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